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We demonstrate that a necessary precondition for unconditionally secure quantum key distribu-
tion is that sender and receiver can use the available measurement results to prove the presence
of entanglement in a quantum state that is effectively distributed between them. One can thus
systematically search for entanglement using the class of entanglement witness operators that can
be constructed from the observed data. We apply such analysis to two well-known quantum key
distribution protocols, namely the 4-state protocol and the 6-state protocol. As a special case, we
show that, for some asymmetric error patterns, the presence of entanglement can be proven even
for error rates above 25% (4-state protocol) and 33% (6-state protocol).
PACS numbers:
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] allows two par-
ties (Alice and Bob) to generate a secret key despite the
computational and technological power of an eavesdrop-
per (Eve), who interfers with the signals. Together with
the Vernam cipher [3], QKD can be used for uncondi-
tionally secure communication.
QKD protocols distinguish typically two phases to es-
tablish a key. In the first phase, an effective bi-partite
quantum mechanical state is distributed between the le-
gitimate users, which establishes correlations between
them. A (restricted) set of measurements is used to mea-
sure these correlations, and the measurement results are
described by a joint probability distribution P (A,B). In
the second phase, called key distillation, Alice and Bob
use an authenticated public channel to process the corre-
lated data in order to obtain a secret key. This procedure
involves, typically, postselection of data, error correction
to reconcile the data, and privacy amplification to decou-
ple the data from a possible eavesdropper [4].
In this Letter we consider the first phase of QKD and
demonstrate that a necessary precondition for success-
ful key distillation is that Alice and Bob can detect the
presence of entanglement in a quantum state that is ef-
fectively distributed between them. Such detection may
involve available observed data only; it can be realized
by using the class of entanglement witness operators that
can be constructed from these data.
Two types of schemes are typically used to create corre-
lated data. In prepare&measure schemes (P&M schemes)
Alice prepares a random sequence of pre-defined non-
orthogonal states that are sent to Bob through an un-
trusted channel (controlled by Eve). Generalizing the
ideas of Bennett et al. [5], the signal preparation can
be thought of as follows: Alice prepares an entangled bi-
partite state of the form |Ψsource〉AB =
∑
i
√
pi|ei〉|ϕi〉.
If she measures the first system in the canonical or-
thonormal basis |ei〉, she effectively prepares the (non-
orthogonal) signal states |ϕi〉 with probabilites pi. The
action of the quantum channel on the state |Ψsource〉AB
leads to an effective bi-partite state shared by Alice and
Bob. One important characteristic of the P&M schemes
is that the reduced density matrix ρA of Alice is fixed
[6]. In entanglement based schemes a bi-partite state is
distributed to Alice and Bob by an, in general, untrusted
third party. This party may be an eavesdropper who is in
possession of a third sub-system that may be entangled
with those given to Alice and Bob. While the subsys-
tems measured by Alice and Bob result in correlations
described by P (A,B), Eve can use her subsystem to ob-
tain information about the data of the legitimate users.
Entanglement based schemes have been introduced by
Ekert [7], who proposed to detect the presence of corre-
lations of quantum mechanical nature by looking at pos-
sible violations of Bell-like inequalities. This is, in gen-
eral, more restrictive than detection of the presence of
entanglement. As we will show below, the success of the
key distillation phase requires that the performed mea-
surements together with P (A,B) suffice to prove that the
(effective) bi-partite state is entangled.
The starting point for our considerations is an upper
bound for the distillation rate of a secure key from the
correlated data via public communication, which is given
by the intrinsic information I(A;B ↓ E), introduced by
Maurer [8]. Consider all possible tri-partite states that
Eve can establish using her eavesdropping method, and
all measurements she could perform on her sub-system.
This gives rise to a set of possible extension P of the ob-
servable probability distribution P (A,B) to P (A,B,E).
Maurer [8] defines I(A;B ↓ E) using the mutual informa-
tion I(A;B|E) between Alice and Bob given the public
announcement of Eve’s data, as described by the condi-
tional probabilites P (A,B|E). In an adaptation of Mau-
rer’s work we define the intrinsic information as
I(A;B ↓ E) = infP I(A;B|E) . (1)
An important consequence is that whenever the ob-
servable data P (A,B) can be explained as coming from
a tripartite state with a separable reduced density matrix
2for Alice and Bob, the intrinsic information vanishes.
Observation 1 Assume that the observable joint prob-
ability distribution P (A,B) together with the knowledge
of the corresponding measurements can be interpreted as
coming from a separable state σAB . Then the intrinsic
information vanishes and no secret key can be distilled
via public communication from the correlated data.
This is easy to see for entanglement based schemes as
we extend a separable reduced density matrix σAB =∑
i qi|ϕi〉A〈ϕi| ⊗ |Φi〉B〈Φi| to a tripartite pure state of
the form |Ψsep〉 =
∑
i
√
qi|ϕi〉A|Φi〉B |ei〉E . Here |ei〉E
is a set of orthonormal vectors spanning a Hilbert space
of sufficient dimension. If Eve measures her sub-system
in the corresponding basis, the conditional probability
distribution conditioned on her measurement result fac-
torizes so that for this measurement I(A;B|E) = 0. As
a consequence, the intrinisic information vanishes and
no secret key can be distilled. In the case of P&M
schemes we need to show additionally that the state
|Ψsep〉 can be obtained by Eve by interaction with Bob’s
system only. In the Schmidt decomposition |Ψsource〉 can
be written as |Ψsource〉 =
∑
i ci|ui〉A|vi〉B. Then the
Schmidt decomposition of |Ψsep〉, with respect of sys-
tem A and the composite system BE, is of the form
|Ψsep〉 =
∑
i ci|ui〉A|e˜i〉BE since ci and |ui〉A are fixed by
the known reduced density matrix ρA to the correspond-
ing values of |Ψsource〉. Then one can find a suitable
unitary operator UBE such that |e˜i〉BE = UBE |vi〉B|0〉E
where |0〉E is an initial state of an auxiliary system.
In both types of schemes it is clear that we can obtain
a secret key whenever the distributed (or effectively dis-
tributed) bi-partite states are entangled qubit states and
we are allowed to perform joint quantum manipulations
on these states. This is true since one can distill maxi-
mally entangled states in this situation [9, 10]. However,
up to now it is not clear whether this is still true if Al-
ice and Bob perform their respective measurements and
can perform only classical operations on their correlated
data. This scenario has been partially addressed under
extra assumptions in [11, 12, 13]. More recently, Ac´in et
al. [14] proved that one can always distill a secret key
from any bi-partite entangled qubit states by adapting
the local measurements to the quantum state and per-
forming subsequently a classical protocol.
Let us now turn to the investigation of the correla-
tions in detail. The question whether the effectively dis-
tributed bi-partite state is entangled can be addressed
based on the ideas of entanglement witnesses. An entan-
glement witness is an observable that detects the pres-
ence of entanglement (if any) of a given state ρ: A state
ρ is entangled iff there exist a hermitian witness opera-
torW such that Tr(Wρ) < 0, while we have Tr(Wσ) ≥ 0
for all separable states σ. These operators, as any bi-
partite hermitian operator, can always be decomposed
into a pseudo-mixture of projectors onto product vectors
W =
∑
i ci |ai〉〈ai|⊗ |bi〉〈bi|, where the coefficients ci are
real numbers and fulfill
∑
i ci = 1 [15, 16, 17]. Given such
a decomposition ofW , the expectation value Tr(Wρ) can
be obtained directly from the expectation value, P (ai, bi).
In our approach we consider the reverse problem:
Given a particular set of local measurements performed
by Alice and Bob, and search for all entanglement wit-
nesses that can be constructed from them.
Theorem 1 Given a set of local operations with POVM
elements Fa ⊗ Gb together with the probability distribu-
tion of their occurrence, P (A,B), then the correlations
P (A,B) cannot lead to a secret key via public commu-
nication unless one can prove the presence of entangle-
ment in the (effectively) distributed state via an entan-
glement witness W =
∑
a,b ca,bFa ⊗ Gb with ca,b real
such that Tr(Wσ) ≥ 0 for all separable states σ and∑
a,b ca,bP (a, b) < 0.
By observation 1 it is a necessary condition for the
success of the key distillation phase that we can exclude
separable quantum states as the origin of the observed
correlations of the first phase. The observed data define
equivalence classes of reduced density matrices that are
compatible with the data. We need to distinguish be-
tween cases where the determined equivalence class con-
tains separable states and those that do not. For this
we proceed as follows: Note that the operators of the
form
∑
a,b ca,bFa ⊗Gb form a real vector space which is
a sub-space of the vector space spanned by the hermi-
tian operator basis of the composite Hilbert space. The
separable density matrices form a compact, convex set
in that vector space, and its projection into a sub-space
is again a compact and convex set formed by elements
that represent the equivalence classes mentioned before.
Each element of this new set can be explained as being
the projection of a separable density matrix, while the el-
ements of the complement of the set cannot be explained
in this way and must therefore come from the projection
of an entangled state. In the subspace, we therefore need
to distinguish a compact and convex set form its comple-
ment, which is done, again, by witness operators. In the
sub-space, all witnesses operators can be realized by defi-
nition. The corresponding operators on the larger vector
space are those witness operators that can be created by
real linear combinations of the local measurements. This
proves the theorem.
The question whether certain correlations are of quan-
tum origin and might lead to a secure key is therefore
reduced to a search over all entanglement witnesses that
can be constructed from the protocol and the collected
data. We will illustrate the consequences of this view for
well-known protocols, namely the 6-state protocol [18]
and the 4-state protocol [2]. In searching through the en-
tanglement witnesses, note that some conditions derived
from witnesses are redundant in the sense that all en-
tangled states detected by one witness can be contained
3in the set of detected entangled states of another wit-
ness. A witness operator W is called optimal [19] if no
other entanglement witness exists that detects all states
detected by W . The class of optimal entanglement wit-
nesses for two qubit states, denoted by OEW, are given
by W = |φe〉〈φe|TP [20], where |φe〉 denotes an entangled
state and TP is the partial trace, that is, the transposi-
tion with respect to one subsystem.
For the case of the 6-state protocol, Alice and Bob
perform projection measurements onto the eigenstates of
the three Pauli operators σx, σy, and σz in the entan-
glement based scheme where Eve distributes bi-partite
qubit states. In the corresponding P&M scheme, Alice
prepares the eigenstates of those operators by performing
the same measurements on a maximally entangled qubit
state. Therefore, the set of three measurement bases used
in the protocol allows Alice and Bob to construct any en-
tanglement witness of the form
W =
∑
i,j={0,x,y,z}
cij σi ⊗ σj , (2)
where σ0 = 1 and cij are real numbers. Note that the
set of operators {σi⊗σj}i,j constitutes an operator basis
in C2 ⊗ C2. Therefore Alice and Bob can evaluate all
entanglement witnesses, in particular the class OEW of
optimal witnesses for two qubits, as given above. This
means that in this protocol all entangled states can be
detected. Alternatively to the witness approach, Alice
and Bob can employ quantum state tomography tech-
niques in connection with the Peres-Horodecki criterion
[21, 22].
While the analysis of the 6-state protocol is quite sim-
ple, the 4-state protocol, however, needs a deeper exam-
ination since it turns out that the optimal witnesses in
OEW cannot be evaluated with the given correlations,
as we will see below. In the four state protocol Alice
and Bob perform projection measurements in two qubit
bases, say x and z. In the corresponding P&M scheme
Alice uses the same set of measurements on a maximally
entangled state.
For the entanglement scheme we obtain the set of en-
tanglement witnesses that can be evaluated with the re-
sulting correlations as
W =
∑
i,j={0,x,z}
cij σi ⊗ σj . (3)
This class, which we shall denote as EW4, can be char-
acterized with the following observation.
Observation 2 Given an entanglement witness W we
find W ∈ EW4 iff W =WT =WTP .
To see this, we start with the general ansatz of Eqn. (2)
and impose the conditions W = WT = WTP . This di-
rectly constraints W to the form (3) since σy is the only
skew-symmetric element in the operator basis. The re-
verse direction is then trivial.
Note that that the elements of OEW,W = |φe〉〈φe|TP ,
are nonpositive, while WTP = |φe〉〈φe| is a positive op-
erator for all entangled states |φe〉. This means that, in
contrast to the case of the 6-state protocol, the 4-state
protocol does not allow to evaluate the optimal witnesses
in OEW. As a result, there can be entangled states that
give rise to correlations P (A,B) that are not sufficient to
prove the presence of entanglement.
The concept of optimal witnesses can be extended by
calling a witnessW optimal in class C iff there is no other
element in C that detects all entangled states detected
by W . Our basic goal is now to characterise a family
of witness operators that are optimal in class EW4, such
that it is sufficient to check this family of witnesses to de-
cide whether the presence of entanglement can be verified
from the given data.
For this purpose we present a necessary condition for
a bi-partite state to contain entanglement that can be
detected by elements of EW4.
Observation 3 Given W ∈ EW4, a necessary condition
to detect entanglement in state ρ is that the operator Ω =
1
4
(
ρ+ ρTA + ρTB + ρT
)
is a non-positive operator.
To see this, let us start by the observation that the sym-
metries of the witness operators in EW4 give rise to the
identity Tr (Wρ) = Tr (WΩ). Now let us assume that
the operator Ω is non-negative. Then one can interpret
it as a density matrix. Since it is invariant under partial
transposition, it must be a separable state. Since W is
a witness operator, we must therefore find Tr (Wρ) ≥ 0.
As a result, we find that the non-positivity of Ω is a nec-
essary condition to detect entanglement of the state ρ
with witnesses in EW4.
Theorem 2 Consider the family of operators W =
1
2
(Q+QTP ), where Q = |φe〉〈φe| and |φe〉 denotes a real
entangled state. The elements of this family are witness
operators that are optimal in EW4 and detect all the en-
tangled states that can be detected within EW4.
Let us start by checking that this family, indeed,
can detect all entanglement that can be detected in
EW4. From the observation 3 we know that we
need only to consider bi-partite states ρn such that
Ωn =
1
4
(
ρn + ρ
TA
n + ρ
TB
n + ρ
T
n
)
is non-positive. We
can find, therefore, an (entangled) state |φn〉 such that
〈φn|Ωn|φn〉 < 0. Moreover, since Ωn = ΩTn , this operator
has a real representation. In this representation, also the
state |φn〉 has a real representation [23]. Let us definine
the projector Q = |φn〉〈φn|. Then we find 〈φn|Ωn|φn〉 =
Tr
(
1
4
(
Q+QTA +QTB +QT
)
ρ
)
. Therefore, we can de-
fine the operator W = 1
4
(
Q+QTA +QTB +QT
)
that
can be further simplified to W = 1
4
(
Q+QTP
)
thanks
4to the real representation of Q. This operator is a wit-
ness operator, since Tr (Wσ) ≥ 0 for all separable states
σ, while Tr (Wρn) < 0 for the chosen ρn. Moreover, by
construction the familiy of these witness operators detect
all entanglement that can be detected within EW4. The
prove of optimality is omitted here. 
The set of witness operators W = 1
2
(Q + QTP ), with
Q = |φe〉〈φe|, provides an infinite number of necessary
and sufficient conditions for the presence of entangle-
ment in the observable correlations P (A,B). Each con-
dition is characterized by a real entangled state |φe〉, and
therefore the coefficients of the pseudo-mixture decom-
position of the corresponding witness operators can be
easily parametrized with three real parameters. ¿From a
practical point of view, this means that Alice and Bob
can easily check this set of conditions numerically.
Let us briefly analyze the implications of our results
in the relationship between the bit error rate e in the
protocols and the presence of correlations of quantum
mechanical nature. Here error rate refers to the sifted
key, that is, those events where signal preparation and
detection employ the same polarization basis. An inter-
cept/resend attack breaks the entanglement and gives
rise to e ≥ 25% (4-state protocol) and e ≥ 33% (6-
state protocol), respectively [18, 24]. This means that if
the error rate is below these values, this already sufficies
to prove that the joint probability distribution P (A,B)
contains quantum mechanical correlations. However, for
some asymmetric error patterns, it is possible to detect
the presence of quantum correlations even for error rates
above 25% (33%). Let us illustrated this fact with an ex-
ample that is motivated by the propagation of the polar-
ization state of a single photon in an optical fiber. This
channel can be described by a unitary transformation
that changes on a timescale much longer than the repe-
tition cycle of the signal source, so it can be thought to
be constant over that time. Consider the unitary trans-
formation U(θ) = cos θ1 − i sin θσy. In this scenario,
the resulting bit error rate is given by e = sin2 θ and
e = 2
3
sin2 θ for the 4-state and the 6-state protocols,
respectively. Nevertheless, in both cases the existence
of quantum correlations can be detected for all angles
θ. The case of the 6-state protocol is clear, since a uni-
tary transformation preserves the entanglement and all
entanglement can be verified in this protocol. With re-
spect to the 4-state protocol, it can also be shown that
there is always an entanglement witness W ∈ EW4 that
detects quantum correlations in P (A,B). In particu-
lar, if we select We =
1
2
(|φe〉〈φe| + |φe〉〈φe|TP ), with
|φe〉 the eigenvector of the operator 12 |ψ〉〈ψ|TP (|ψ〉 =
cos θ|00〉 + sin θ|01〉 − sin θ|10〉 + cos θ|11〉) which corre-
sponds to its negative eigenvalue, then we find in a suit-
able representation as a pseudo-mixture for the entangle-
ment witness that Tr(Weρ) =
∑
i ci P (ai, bi) = − 14 .
To conclude, we have as a necessary condition for QKD
that the legitimate users can prove the presence of entan-
glement in the effectively distributed quantum state. In
order to construct practical and efficient new QKD pro-
tocols, it is vital to separate the generation of two-party
correlations from the public discussion protocol which
extracts a key from those data. We have analyzed the
4-state and 6-state QKD protocols, and we have derived
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
quantum correlations in both protocols. As a special
case, we have demonstrated that, for some asymmetric
error patterns, the presence of this type of correlations
can be detected even for error rates above 25% and 33%,
respectively.
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